Britain must step up if America pulls back: why ammunition, armoured vehicles, and firepower are vital to keep Ukraine in the fight

By William Freer

This week Zelensky, President of Ukraine, is in the United States (US) to present a ‘plan for victory’ to Joe Biden, whose time in office as president will be over in the coming months.

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So what impact might the US election have on Ukraine’s war efforts, and how can Britain continue to support Ukraine – regardless of the outcome on the 5th November?

The US Election

The US has by some margin been the single largest source of military aid: worth approximately £43 billion. In comparison, the next largest donor, Germany, has provided £8.5 billion worth of military aid.

Without US aid, Ukraine would struggle to conduct offensive operations, but it should still be able to maintain frontlines roughly where they are in the face of continuing Russian attacks (assuming all other factors remain constant). This has happened before; when Congress delayed aid for months, until April 2024.

There is no reason other countries could not step up to fill any gap. The collective Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the European members of NATO vastly outmatches that of Russia’s; around 11 times the size (with the US, it is well over 20 times). It is a question of political choice.

Many of Europe’s wealthiest nations have long underinvested in defence. Some, particularly those along NATO’s northern and eastern flanks (such as Poland and Sweden) are showing the way and have significantly increased investment in defence. If some of Europe's other countries were to adopt a similar attitude, they could fill much of the void that may result from potential disinterest or paralysis in Washington, DC.

What can Britain do?

The UK has long been one of Ukraine’s most ardent supporters. It has trained Ukrainian soldiers since the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 and provided the crucial anti-tank weapons which saved Ukraine in the early days of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Recently, the National Audit Office released a report on Britain’s support for Ukraine. The key takeaway of which is that the UK has been effective at managing the sourcing and delivery of aid – the Armed Forces and Civil Servants involved deserve due credit for their innovation and ability to do things quickly – but that efforts require additional resources and stronger political will.

This begs the question: what does Ukraine need:

Ammunition: Without shells for its artillery and bullets for its troops, Ukrainian lines would collapse. There is a very simple answer to this problem, build more production capacity. Plants are already producing all that they can, and much of what could be sourced from allied (and neutral) stocks has been used up. Britain should overcome fiscal nerves in the Treasury and invest in more production capacity.

Armoured/protected mobility: Needed for keeping Ukrainian troops alive and building the mechanised formations needed to plug gaps in the frontline or prepare limited counter-attacks to weaken Russian lines. Many vehicles have already been sent to Ukraine, but they need vastly more. A number of formations simply do not have any heavy equipment: around 30 territorial brigades are armed only with small arms, and a further 14 reserve brigades are waiting on heavy equipment.

Long-range firepower, and the ability to use it: This has gained much attention in recent weeks in the debate over the use of British-made Storm Shadows in Russia, in particular concerns over Russian escalation. Escalation management is important, but being too cautious runs the risk of emboldening an adversary. Striking military logistics targets within Russia would significantly curtail the combat effectiveness of Russian forces in Ukraine.

Both sides have suffered heavy losses in the fighting so far. Britain should increase its efforts regardless of what happens across the Atlantic, both politically (in pushing others to do more) and fiscally, to ensure Ukrainian losses are minimised and Russian losses are maximised – the Council on Geostrategy published a more detailed look at how this could be achieved here.

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William Freer is a Research Fellow in National Security at the Council on Geostrategy.

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